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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the right to
refuse medical treatment as a constitutionally protected liberty interest.'
Ohio common law also recognizes a person's right to refuse medical
treatment based upon the doctrine of informed consent.2 To avoid receiv-
ing certain types of life-sustaining treatment, Ohioans may authorize an
attorney in fact to make health care decisions under the Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care statute.3 While the statute is designed to
give the attorney in fact the authority to make health care decisions, this
authority does not extend to the refusal of life-sustaining treatment in
non-terminal cases, nor does it extend to the refusal or withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration except in very limited circumstances. 4 At present,
an Ohioan wishing to provide an advance directive regarding the ter-
mination of treatment in non-terminal cases and/or the provision of nu-
trition and hydration has no other statutory mechanism to do so since
neither a natural death act 5 nor living will statute6 has yet been passed
by the Ohio legislature.7
This paper will first review the development of Ohio case law prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health" along with the Cruzan decision and Ohio's Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care statute. Next, the constitutionality of the lim-
itations in the Durable Power of Attorney Health Care statute will be
discussed. The standard of evidence which must be met in Ohio in order
to implement an incompetent's wishes regarding medical treatment in
the absence of a durable power will be analyzed. Recommendations will
be presented regarding what Ohioans should do in order to increase the
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (Leach II), 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047
(Summit Cty. 1984).
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-17 (Baldwin 1990).
'Id. at § 1337.13.
'These are statutes which establish certain requirements for providing a di-
rective to physicians regarding future medical treatment choices. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 - 95 (West Supp. 1990) which provides a statutory
form that a competent person may sign to refuse medical treatment at a time
when the person is no longer competent and in a terminal condition. However,
this statute provides that if a person executes a directive prior to being diagnosed
as terminal, the directive is not binding on health care providers.
I A living will is a statutory mechanism which permits a competent person to
execute a formal, witnessed legal document to direct future health care at a time
when the person becomes incompetent. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201-
214 (1990). A living will applies in a greater variety of situations than a directive
executed pursuant to a natural death act, and living will statutes often allow the
appointment of a surrogate decision-maker.7 Three different pieces of living will legislation recently have been introduced
in the Ohio legislature. See infra notes 166 thru 192 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these.8 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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likelihood that their choices regarding all forms of medical treatment,
including nutrition and hydration, are carried out. Ohio's proposed living
will legislation will be examined along with representative legislation
from other jurisdictions. Finally, a legislative solution to the multifaceted
issues regarding the right to refuse treatment in Ohio will be suggested.
II. OHIO LAW PRIOR TO CRUZAN
A. The Leach Cases
Grounding their holdings on either a constitutional right to privacy or
the common law doctrine of informed consent, Ohio courts have permitted
the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment.9 ,'0 Ohio courts have
recognized a surrogate's authority to exercise this right. 1 Further, sur-
rogates frequently exercise this right in Ohio without judicial interven-
tion.
In Leach I, a court allowed a patient's guardian to discontinue his wife's
ventilator. Mrs. Leach was a seventy-two year old woman who was di-
agnosed in June, 1980, with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a progressively
debilitating, terminal disease of the nervous system which would result
in her death within the next three to five years. The following month,
she was admitted to Akron General Medical Center with respiratory
distress and in a "stuporous" condition.' 2 She arrested two days later and
was placed on life support which included a ventilator, a nasogastric tube
and a foley catheter. 3 She was later diagnosed as being in a chronic
vegetative state and was non-responsive to external stimuli. However,
she did react to deep pain by grimacing and her brain wave test dem-
onstrated a very low brain activity.14 She could not be weaned from the
ventilator.' 5
Her husband requested that the ventilator be discontinued. Her doctor
refused stating that the life support could only be terminated by a court
order which Mr. Leach then sought. Mr. Leach was appointed legal guard-
ian of Mrs. Leach and a guardian ad litem was also appointed.1 6
'Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d
809 (Summit Cty. 1980).
"0 Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (Leach I1), 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047
(Summit Cty. 1984).
1 Leach 1, 68 Ohio Misc. at 1, 426 N.E.2d at 809.
12 Id. at 2, 426 N.E.2d at 810. "Stuporous" is defined as partial or nearly
complete unconsciousness. SLOAN-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DIc-
TIONARY 676 (West 1987).
1s Leach , 68 Ohio Misc. at 3, 426 N.E.2d at 810. A ventilator is used to provide
artificial, mechanical ventilation of the lungs. A nasogastric tube is inserted
through the nose and extends into the stomach. It may be used to provide artificial
nutrition and/or hydration or to remove the gastric contents from the stomach.
A foley catheter drains urine from the bladder outside the body.
14 Id.
I Id.
16 Id.
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An evidentiary hearing was held during which a total of seventeen
witnesses testified as to numerous conversations with Mrs. Leach con-
cerning life support systems. 17 The last of these conversations took place
only two days before she entered the hospital, at which time Mrs. Leach
expressed a desire that she not be placed on life support systems. 18
The court framed the issue not as a decision between life or death, but
rather:
[t]he basic question is how long will society require Mrs. Leach
and others similarly situated to remain on the threshold of
certain death suspended and sustained there by artificial life
supports. 19
Concluding that a constitutional right of privacy allowed a terminally ill
but competent person to choose medical treatment, the court determined
that "the terminally ill should be treated equally, whether competent or
incompetent." 2 The court then examined what compelling state interests
would outweigh the individual's right.
The court reviewed the four potential interests generally advanced by
states in these types of cases: the preservation of life, the protection of
third parties, the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession, and the prevention of suicide. 21 The court concluded that there
was no benefit to the State of Ohio in preserving Mrs. Leach's life under
the circumstances and also that no third party would suffer from her
death.22 The court concluded that the termination of an extraordinary life
support system for a terminally ill patient in an irreversible coma was
not inconsistent with the current state of medical ethics. Finally, the
court determined that the withdrawal of the ventilator was not suicide,
but rather "evinces only an intent to forego extraordinary measures, and
allows the processes of nature to run their course."23 Thus, the court
concluded the state's interests did not outweigh Mrs. Leach's constitu-
tional right, as exercised through her guardian, to choose to forego med-
ical treatment.2 4
In determining Mrs. Leach's intent regarding treatment, the court
adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard. 25 Mrs. Leach had made
17 Id.
"I Id. at 4, 426 N.E.2d at 811. One witness recalled that Mrs. Leach had stated
"'[t]hat's the one thing that terrifies me. I don't want to be put on life support
systems. I don't want to live if I have to be a vegetable.'" Id.
19 Id. at 6, 426 N.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 8,426 N.E.2d at 813 (quotingIn re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1980)).
21 Id. at 9, 426 N.E.2d at 814-15.
Id. at 9, 426 N.E.2d at 814. Moreover, the court recognized that there were
a number of detriments to the state, the patient and her family which would
result from attempting to delay her death. Id.
Id. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
24 Id.
2 1Id. at 11, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
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no advance written directive regarding her wishes to refuse or terminate
medical treatment if she became incompetent. Recognizing that the bur-
den of proof normally used in a civil matter is a preponderance of the
evidence standard, the court stated that "because of the nature and im-
portance of the issues involved, this court would be remiss if it did not
adopt the highest possible civil standard of clear and convincing."26
A doctor and neurologist were ordered to examine and certify that Mrs.
Leach was in a permanent vegetative state and that there was no "rea-
sonable medical possibility" that Mrs. Leach would "regain a sapient or
cognitive function. '27 It is notable that the authorization to remove life
support extended only to the removal of the ventilator and to no other
life supports so that the feeding tube was not discontinued. 28
After the ventilator was removed and Mrs. Leach died, her husband
and family again brought suit against the attending physician and the
hospital. In Leach 11,29 the family claimed that Mrs. Leach was wrongfully
placed on life support systems on August 1, 1980 and maintained on life
support without her or her family's consent. The plaintiffs sought com-
pensatory damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish for both them-
selves and the decedent for the time Mrs. Leach was continued on life
support systems, as well as punitive damages. Additionally, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants' failure to inform the family of Mrs. Leach's
condition, prognosis, and course of treatment for two months constituted
malpractice and/or a misrepresentation amounting to fraud. They also
claimed that experimental drugs were administered without consent and
that the removal of Mrs. Leach's ventilator on January 6, 1981, consti-
tuted an unreasonable delay in complying with the probate court's De-
cember 18, 1980 order to terminate her life supports. The trial court
dismissed all of the claims. In affirming the dismissal of the invasion of
privacy claim, but reversing the trial court's dismissal of most of the
plaintiff's other claims,30 the court of appeals discussed several points of
law.
First, the court stated that an incompetent patient's life support could
only be disconnected pursuant to a court order3' and noted that this
2 Id. citing Ayres v. Cook 140 Ohio St. 281, 43 N.E.2d 287 (1942) and Flax v.
Williams, 25 Ohio Law Abs. 680 (1937). The court rejected the arguments of the
guardian ad litem and the hospital who requested even higher burdens of proof.
2 Leach 1, 68 Ohio Misc. at 12, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
28 Id. at 13, 426 N.E.2d at 816. The court's order of December 18, 1980 also
granted both civil and criminal immunity to the patient's guardian, the hospital,
physician or other person who participated in the act of discontinuing the ven-
tilator. Mrs. Leach was disconnected from the ventilator on January 6, 1981 and
died the same day. Id.
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (Leach I1), 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047
(Summit Cty. 1984).
The case was eventually settled.
3,Court orders have not regularly been sought before discontinuing life sup-
port. Commonly, when a consensus among family members regarding treatment
is reached, ventilators are disconnected consistent with the medical judgment of
the physician. In the experience of the authors, a pronouncement such as this
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holding was in accord with other states that had addressed this issue.32
The court also stated that "absent legislation to the contrary, the com-
petent patient's right to refuse treatment is absolute until the quality of
the competing interests [are] weighed in a court proceeding. '33 The court
stated that this right was a logical extension of the requirement that a
patient must consent to treatment and concluded that a patient could
recover for battery if his refusal was ignored. 34 While the court made no
distinction between the rights of competent and incompetent patients to
refuse treatment, Mrs. Leach had apparently expressly advised her doc-
tors while competent "that she did not wish to be kept alive by ma-
chines."3 5 The court added that "general statements by the patient could
still be considered by a court, of course, in determining the wishes of a
patient in a chronic vegetative condition." 6 The court also recognized the
right of a terminally ill, competent patient to refuse treatment which
prolonged suffering.37
The two Leach cases illustrate the "Catch-22" that exists for health
care providers. In Leach 1, the guardian had petitioned for the removal
of the patient's life support systems which apparently included the ven-
tilator, nasogastric tube and foley catheter.38 In granting the request, the
court limited the termination of the life support systems to include only
the ventilator.39 Since the Leach II decision would have apparently per-
raises many questions and reinforces the need for comprehensive legislation in
this area. For example, legislation would resolve the issue of whether a court
order is needed in every case prior to terminating life supports or only in cases
where a disagreement exists. At present, no clear guidance is available for health
care providers. Further, requiring court orders in every case is directly contrary
to the position taken by the National Center for State Courts and State Justice
Institute in the Draft Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Authorizing
or Withholding Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment 1, 8 (Draft No. 7) (November
1990) [hereinafter Guidelines]. According to the Guidelines: "Judicial involve-
ment should occur only when there are irresolvable disagreements among the
primary decision-makers, or there are serious grounds for believing there is a
need for protective services." Id. Notwithstanding a patient's status, nutrition
and hydration have generally not been discontinued.
32 Leach If, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053 citing, inter alia,
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977). As pointed out by one commentator, the Leach II court was
incorrect in its conclusion since the Massachusetts courts had modified the re-
quirement for court orders in subsequent cases decided prior to Leach II. See In
re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980), in Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: De-
velopments in the Law, 85 Den. U.L. Rev. 181, 201 (1988).
- Leach II, 13 Ohio App.3d at 395, 426 N.E.2d at 1051-52.
s Id.
Id. at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
Id. at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
17 Id. As previously noted, the trial court's dismissal was reversed and the case
eventually settled.
' 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3,426 N.E.2d 809,810 (Summit Cty. 1980) ('The life support
system consists of a respirator, a nasogastric tube and a catheter .... Mr. Leach
instituted an action for an order to discontinue life supports of Edna Marie Leach.")
(emphasis added).
Id. at 13, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
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mitted recovery on a battery theory for the unconsented to application of
all life supports, 40 the health care providers could have incurred liability
for the continued nasogastric tube feedings had Mrs. Leach lived without
the ventilator, even though the Leach I court did not permit nasogastric
tube to be discontinued. This anomalous situation points out the need for
adequate, comprehensive guidelines for the refusal or termination of all
types of life support systems.
B. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Statute
In order to allow Ohioans to designate a proxy to make health care
decisions in advance of any future incompetency, the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care statute was passed in June of 1989.41 This
statute allows a competent person to plan for future incompetency
through the designation of an attorney in fact as a health care decision-
maker.4 2 The instrument becomes effective if and when the principal loses
the capacity to make informed health care decisions for himself.43 The
statute provides that the authorization may include the right to give
informed consent, or to refuse to give consent, or to withdraw consent to
"any health care"- that is being or could be provided to the principal.45
Subject to any express limitations in the instrument or as otherwise
provided in the statute, the attorney in fact may make health care de-
cisions for the principal "to the same extent as the principal could make
those decisions for himself if he had the capacity to do So. '46 However,
this is contradicted by a later section which provides that an attorney in
4 Leach II, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 395-96, 469 N.E.2d at 1052. "The complaint
alleges that Mrs. Leach was placed on life support systems on August 1, 1980,
without the consent of Mrs. Leach or her family." Id. The life support systems
had previously been described by the court as including a ventilator, nasgoastric
tube and foley catheter. Leach 1, 68 Ohio Misc. at 3, 426 N.E.2d at 810.)
41 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-17 (Baldwin 1990).
420mo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-17 (Baldwin 1990). To be valid, the durable
power must be written, signed and dated by the principal. It must either be
witnessed by two disinterested individuals (the statute excludes those providing
health care to the principal, as well as persons who would benefit in any way
from the death of the principal) or acknowledged by the principal before a notary
public. Id. at §§ 1337.12(A), (C). The statute also provides that a durable power
of attorney for health care expires after seven years unless re-executed by the
principal. Id. at § 1337.12(A)(3).
4Id. at § 1337.13(A)(1).
" Id. at § 1337.12(A)(1).
Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(B) (Baldwin 1990) defines health care as
"any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an
individual's physical or mental condition."
4Id. at § 1337.13(A)(1). See Feibel, Health Care Law Helps-A Little, Business
First, Oct. 30, 1989, at 7, col. 1. 'The new law provides a partial solution for
terminating life-support for the terminally ill, but it does not give a non-terminal
but incapacitated patient the same right to avoid life-saving treatment that the
patient would possess were he or she competent." Id.
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fact does not have the authority "to refuse or withdraw informed consent
to health care that is necessary to maintain the life of the principal,
unless the principal is in a terminal condition.
'47
An attorney in fact also does not have the authority to refuse or with-
draw informed consent to health care necessary to provide "comfort
care. ' 48 An attorney in fact may refuse or withdraw informed consent to
the provision of nutrition and hydration only when two physicians concur
that (1) the provision of nutrition and hydration would not provide com-
fort, and that either (2) death is imminent whether or not nutrition or
hydration is provided and the non-provision of such is not likely to result
in the death of the principal by malnutrition or dehydration, or (3) nu-
trition or hydration could not be assimilated or would shorten the prin-
cipal's life.'
9
In addition, if a principal has previously consented to health care, an
attorney in fact may not withdraw such consent unless (1) the principal's
condition has changed resulting in a significant decrease in the benefit
of health care or (2) the health care is not significantly effective in achiev-
ing the purposes for which the principal's consent was originally given. 0
Notably, there is no provision in the statute regarding alternative de-
cision-making for an incompetent patient who has not executed a valid
durable power. In addition, the limitations on the powers of an attorney
in fact are counterproductive since they severely restrict a principal's
ability to control the type and amount of health care provided if incom-
petency occurs. While Ohio has joined other states in limiting the ability
11 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin 1990) (emphasis added). Ter-
minal condition is defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(I) (Baldwin 1990)
as "any illness or injury that is likely to result in imminent death, regardless of
the type, nature, and amount of health care that is provided." This section places
an affirmative obligation on the attorney in fact to consent to certain types of
care.
4 Id. at § 1337.13(C). The term "comfort care" is not defined.
4 Id. at § 1337.13(E)(1)-(3). It will be the rare occasion when an attorney in
fact will be able to terminate nutrition and/or hydration under the statute. Lim-
iting the withdrawal or refusal of treatment to situations where death is "im-
minent," whether or not medical treatment is used, greatly reduces the potential
of an advance directive. See President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 1, 143 (1983)
[hereinafter Deciding to Forego]. Further, the statute also grants blanket im-
munity from liability to the physician and health care facility potentially re-
sulting from non-compliance with an attorney in fact's decision regarding
treatment. For example, if the patient's condition meets the statutory criteria for
termination of nutrition and hydration and the attorney in fact requests such
termination pursuant to the patient's previously expressed wishes, the health
care providers risk no liability for non-compliance with this choice. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1337.15(B), (D) (Baldwin 1990) "A physician is not ... liable in
damages ... for providing or failing to withdraw health care that is necessary to
keep the principal alive." One commentator has suggested that this "safe harbor"
provision could "induce the medical community to provide life-sustaining treat-
ment in all events." Feibel, supra note 46, at 7, col. 2.
SOHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(F) (Baldwin 1990).
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to terminate nutrition and hydration, 51 Ohio's statute goes even further
in that it may even prevent the attorney in fact from withholding this
in the first instance. 52 These limitations prevent the incompetent prin-
cipal from enjoying the same privilege as a competent person to refuse
or terminate all forms of life-sustaining medical treatment.
C. Couture's Interpretation of the Durable Power for Health Care Statute
As if all the limitations in the Durable Power for Health Care statute
weren't enough, an Ohio appellate court 53 has held that those limitations
apply to a guardianship situation even in the absence of a durable power.
Daniel Couture was a twenty-nine year old who became comatose on
April 20, 1989, as a result of medication he had received.- He was placed
on a ventilator and a feeding tube was inserted. His divorced parents
each filed applications for guardianship which was eventually awarded
to his mother. Based upon the advice of Daniel's physician, as well as
other family members, his mother decided that it was in Daniel's best
interest to terminate the use of the ventilator and the feeding tube. His
father objected and instituted legal proceedings to prevent the withdrawal
of these treatments and to remove the mother as guardian. At the hearing
before the probate court on June 26, 1989, a medical expert testified that
Daniel's underlying condition had created "fluid on the brain" and that
he would continue to live only one or two more months. 55 The expert
stated that under these circumstances, medical ethics and procedures
would permit the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 6 It was the
position of the hospital, Daniel's physician and his mother that with-
drawal of treatment was appropriate. In denying the father's requests for
injunctive and declaratory relief, the probate court stated that the guard-
ian was entitled to make decisions regarding treatment and care after
consultation with the ward's doctors, which were in the ward's "best
interests.'
7
On June 28, 1989, Daniel's father appealed these decisions to the court
of appeals. The same day, the court issued a temporary restraining order
to prevent the removal of any life support system pending further court
11 See, e.g., Health Care Surrogate Act of Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 311.978 (Baldwin 1990) (with certain exceptions "nutrition and hydration shall
always be provided").
12 For example, if the principal is non-terminal, then the attorney in fact cannot
withhold consent to health care necessary to maintain the principal's life. OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Baldwin 1990). See generally Kapp, Ohio's New
Durable Power of Attorney, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 541 (1989).
"Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Montgomery Cty.
1989).
Id. at 209, 549 N.E.2d at 572.
"Id. at 210-11, 549 N.E.2d at 573.
56 Id. at 210-11, 549 N.E.2d at 573.
17 Id. at 209, 549 N.E.2d at 572.
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order and later granted an injunction while the father appealed. In the
interim, Daniel was weaned from the ventilator, but continued to receive
hydration and nutrition through his feeding tube. Subsequently, the
mother voluntarily withdrew as guardian and the father was appointed.
A guardian ad litem was also appointed. The issue in the case was whether
nutrition and hydration could be withdrawn.
Even though no durable power had been executed in this case, the court
of appeals looked to Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
statute in making its decision.58 The court determined that this statute
had announced a public policy forbidding the withdrawal of hydration
and nutrition in a case of this kind. Even though this was a case involving
a guardianship and not an attorney in fact under the statute, the court
stated that the public policy of Ohio as evidenced by the statute is "opposed
to the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under these circumstances,
notwithstanding the wishes of the patient or his surrogate."59
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that if it could not give
effect to a person's express written direction to withdraw nutrition or
hydration because it was not generally permitted under the new statute,
then the same prohibitions applied to a guardian's decision. 60 The court
concluded that even if the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration had been
permitted by the statute, the guardian's decision, made in reliance upon
the ward's casual oral remarks, was even less compelling than a person's
express written directions to terminate nutrition and hydration.61 The
court ordered that no party was permitted to take any steps to withdraw
nutrition or hydration from Daniel.
In refusing to permit the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, the
court determined that although Daniel was "terminally ill,' ' 2 his death
was not "imminent"6 3 since he could survive one to two months. Addi-
- OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-17 (Baldwin 1990). The Couture decision
was rendered on August 21, 1989. The statute was not effective until September
27, 1989.
59 Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d at 213, 549 N.E.2d at 575-76.
60 Id. Evidently, the court reasoned that because an attorney in fact was re-
quired to act "in the best interest" of the principal when the principal's desires
regarding treatment were unknown, and that as a matter of law, nutrition and
hydration could not be terminated by an attorney in fact, a guardian acting under
the same standard, the "best interest" of the ward, was prohibited from refusing
or terminating nutrition and hydration. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.13
(Baldwin 1990).61 Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 213, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
62 See supra note 47, for definition of terminal.
SOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(E) (Baldwin 1990) states that nutrition and
hydration may only be discontinued by an attorney in fact when death is
imminent. The term "imminent" is not defined in the statute. One commentator
has noted: "[i]f the medical certainty of death within 30 days is not considered
imminent by the courts, then what is, and what use is such a shortened span to
the grieving family?" Jenkins, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 4 OHio
LAWYER 26, 31 (May-June 1990).
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tionally, the court concluded that the non-provision of nutrition and hy-
dration would result in his death by malnutrition and dehydration and,
thus, was not permitted under the statute.
Although moot in light of the court's interpretation of the statute, the
court discussed the "substituted judgment" standard. Under this stand-
ard, a guardian would attempt to reach the decision that the incapacitated
person would make were he able to choose.-
Ironically, the court stated that Daniel did make legally significant
statements since: (1) his remarks were made on several occasions, (2)
over a period of four to five years, and (3) were clearly articulated and
made with knowledge that his own medical problems posed a risk that
he would be placed on life support systems. 65 Thus, the court concluded
that these statements were "legally sufficient" to support the substituted
judgment of the guardian to discontinue nutrition and hydration had it
been permitted by law.6 Noting that an advance directive would have
the most probative value in determining a person's wishes regarding
medical treatment because it would clearly reflect a prior competent
choice, the court stated that it was not necessary that the evidence show
exactly what the ward would do in the precise circumstances at hand
since application of such a standard would impose an impossible eviden-
tiary burden.
6 7
A strong argument can be made that the Couture court misinterpreted
the legislative intent behind the limitations in the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care statute. Given that the statute permits the
attorney in fact to terminate treatment without any evidence of what the
patient would have desired in the given circumstances, the Ohio legis-
lature was understandably reluctant to permit decisions by an attorney
in fact in the "hardest" cases (i.e., cases where death is not "imminent"
and/or those involving hydration and feedihg) absent such evidence. In
light of the then current state of the common law in Ohio (i.e., Leach I
and Leach I), the legislature likely preferred a court determination in a
guardianship setting based on clear and convincing evidence of the pa-
tient's wishes before permitting termination of life support in such ex-
treme cases. However, there is nothing to indicate the legislature meant
to reverse the prior common law in this area.68 Unfortunately, the absence
of comprehensive legislation in this area has led at least one Ohio court
to refuse termination of treatment even where clear and convincing evi-
dence demonstrated the patient's desire for the same.
11 Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d at 214, 549 N.E.2d at 576.
c6 Id.
IUd.
6714.
8 See infra note 171, regarding proposed legislation which will articulate the
legislative intent underlying this statute.
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III. THE CRUZAN DECISION
A. The Majority Decision
The long awaited decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Cruzan69 did little to resolve this area of the law and is more significant
for the issues it leaves unanswered than for those it answers.
Nancy Beth Cruzan had been in a hospital since the night of January
11, 1983, when she suffered irreversible brain damage as a result of an
automobile accident. Nancy's condition was described as a "persistent
vegetative state," in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces
no indications of significant cognitive function.70 She was oblivious to her
environment except for reflexive responses to sound and painful stimuli.
Although not terminally ill nor clinically dead, loss of oxygen to Nancy's
brain for several minutes following the accident caused cerebral cortical
atrophy which was determined to be "irreversible, permanent, progressive
and ongoing."7' Although unable to swallow food or water, medical experts
testified that with artificial hydration and feeding she could live another
thirty years.
7 2
When it became apparent that Nancy had virtually no chance of re-
covering her cognitive faculties, her parents asked the hospital to ter-
minate the artificial feeding and hydration procedures, which all agreed
would certainly cause her death. When this request was refused, Nancy's
parents sought a court order directing withdrawal of the artificial feeding
and hydration.
The Missouri trial court granted the order, concluding that a person in
Nancy's condition has a fundamental right under both the state and
federal constitutions to refuse or direct withdrawal of "death prolonging
procedures. '73 The trial court concluded that Nancy's expressed thoughts
at the age of twenty-five in a conversation with her housemate that if
she were injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could
live "at least half-way normally," provided sufficient evidence that given
her present condition she would not wish to continue with her nutrition
and hydration.7 4
Although the court-appointed guardian ad litem agreed with the trial
court's decision, the guardian felt compelled to appeal the order to the
Missouri Supreme Court. That court, by a divided vote, ruled that the
Missouri Living Will statute75 embodied a state policy strongly favoring
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
70 Id. at 2845. See generally Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The
Medical Reality, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27 (1988).
7, Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. en banc 1988).
72 Id.
71 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2846.
74 Id.75 Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010-.055 (1986).
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the preservation of life and that "clear and convincing evidence" as to
what Nancy's wishes would be under the circumstances was required
before an order terminating artificial feeding and hydration could be
granted. 6 The court acknowledged a right to refuse treatment based upon
the common law doctrine of informed consent but declined to read a broad
right of privacy into the Missouri Constitution which would support the
right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance.7
The court found that the lifetime remarks of Nancy to her roommate were
insufficient to satisfy this requirement and, therefore, reversed the order
of the trial court. Nancy's parents then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court on the grounds that the refusal to withdraw artificial
feeding and hydration violated Nancy's rights of privacy and due process
under the federal Constitution. The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of Missouri Supreme Court.
78
In the majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court re-
viewed a number of state supreme court decisions regarding right-to-die
issues, which were based on various combinations of common law and/or
state and federal constitutional principles. The issue for the Supreme
Court, according to the majority, was "simply and starkly whether the
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of
decision which it did. ' 79 The majority acknowledged that "this is the first
case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue of whether
the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance re-
ferred to as a 'right to die'."8' 0
The Court recognized that the principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse unwanted medical treatment
could be inferred from the Supreme Court's prior decisions. 81 But the
majority also indicated that determining that a person has a liberty in-
terest under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry, and the
76 Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Mo. en banc 1988).
77 Id. at 417.
78 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856. Subsequent to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court, Nancy's parents repetitioned the probate court for termination
of their daughter's life support based on new evidence. On December 14, 1990,
Probate Judge Charles Teel ruled that there was clear and convincing evidence
of Nancy Cruzan's wishes to terminate treatment and that the feeding tube could
be discontinued. At the hearing, two former co-workers and one former employer
testified about conversations during which Nancy indicated that she would not
wish to be kept alive in a vegetative state. The State of Missouri withdrew from
the case in September, 1990, announcing that it no longer had "'a recognizable
legal interest'" in the case. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 2; Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1; UPI, Dec. 14, 1990, Domestic News (BC
Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Omni file). Nancy's life support was terminated
on December 14, 1990, and she died on December 26, 1990. Proprietary to the
UPI, Dec. 27, 1990, Domestic News (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Current
file).
'9 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
Io d.
11 Id. at 2852.
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issue of whether an individual's constitutional rights have been violated
must be determined by balancing the individual's liberty interests against
the relevant state interests.8 2 The State of Missouri had asserted an "un-
qualified interest" in the preservation of life. 83
For purposes of its decision, the majority "assumed" that the federal
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition. The issue presented
in this case was the right of a surrogate to exercise such a right on behalf
of an incompetent.
The Court found that Missouri has established its own procedures for
determining whether a surrogate may elect to have hydration and nu-
trition withdrawn on behalf of an incompetent person, in a way to assure
that the action of the surrogate conformed to the wishes expressed by the
patient while competent. The majority concluded that Missouri may le-
gitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice by re-
quiring "clear and convincing evidence" as to the intent of the patient
when competent.84 The majority noted that the purpose of a clear and
convincing standard of proof is to instruct the fact-finder concerning the
degree of confidence the state requires in the correctness of a factual
conclusion in light of the gravity of the issue. The Court concluded it was
permissible for Missouri to place an increased risk of an erroneous de-
cision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's life-
sustaining treatment, in light of the fact that an erroneous decision not
to terminate would result in the maintenance of the status quo and the
possibility that subsequent developments (such as advancements in med-
ical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent,
changes in law, or the unexpected death of the patient) created the po-
tential that a wrong decision not to terminate would eventually be cor-
rected or its impact mitigated. On the other hand, an erroneous decision
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is irreversible.
The Court specifically rejected the argument that the federal Consti-
tution requires a right of substituted judgment in immediate family mem-
bers or court-appointed surrogates, holding that the Due Process Clause
requires the state to repose judgment on these matters with no one but
the patient herself.8 5 However, the majority specifically left open the issue
of whether a state would be required to follow the decision of a surrogate
if there were competent and probative evidence to establish that the
patient had expressed a desire that if she became incompetent the decision
as to whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for her by
that surrogate.8 6
82 Id. at 2851-52. The majority held that a right to refuse treatment is more
properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, rather
than a generalized right of privacy.
Id. at 2853.84 d.
8 Id. at 2855.
" Id. at 2856.
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority
in finding that Missouri did not unconstitutionally interfere with Nancy
Cruzan's liberty interest by refusing to order the termination of artificial
hydration and feeding. However, Justice O'Connor emphasized that what-
ever right to refuse treatment does exist, it should extend not only to
medical treatment, but should also include the provision of artificial hy-
dration and feeding."7 Justice O'Connor also emphasized that a state may
be constitutionally required to give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decision-maker appointed by the patient when competent. 8 Since forced
medical treatment "may burden [an] individual's liberty interests as
much as any state coercion," states should consider "equally probative
source[s] of evidence" of a patient's intent, specifically "the patient's ap-
pointment of a proxy to make health care decisions on her behalf."' 9 While
the states were charged with developing "appropriate procedures" for
protecting incompetents' liberty interests, these statements suggest that
states should defer to the decisions of a proxy decision-maker when one
has been appointed by a prior competent person.90
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, rejected the notion that the
federal Constitution protected a right to refuse medical treatment. He
reasoned that since ordinary suicide is not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and ordinary suicide and the right to refuse medical treat-
ment are indistinguishable for constitutional purposes, there was no sub-
stantive due process issue presented under the federal Constitution by a
state's interference in the decision to refuse treatment.91
B. The Dissent
Justice Brennan 2 unequivocally recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a significant liberty in-
terest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment. He agreed with Justice
O'Connor that there was no reason for distinguishing between artificial
hydration and feeding and other forms of medical treatment with respect
to the constitutional right to refuse treatment.
While recognizing that no constitutionally recognized individual right
is absolute, Justice Brennan concluded that Nancy Cruzan's right to re-
81 Id. at 2856-57. "The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water" Id.
8Id. Justice O'Connor noted that thirteen states and the District of Columbia
had adopted durable power of attorney statutes expressly authorizing the ap-
pointment of proxies for making health care decisions, and another thirteen states
had living will statutes which authorized the appointment of health care proxies.
In her view, the majority's decision that one state's practice did not violate the
constitutional liberty interest in refusing treatment. Id.
Id. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2859-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at
2867.
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fuse treatment was fundamental and outweighed any possible state in-
terest in this case.9 3 He also stated that the state had no interest simply
in prolonging an individual's life, as evidenced by the fact that Missouri
had adopted a living will statute which allows and encourages pre-
planned termination of life. The only legitimate state interest, according
to Justice Brennan, is a parens patriae interest in providing an incom-
petent patient with an accurate as possible determination of how she
would have exercised her rights under these circumstances had she been
competent to do so. Only if there is a determination that the patient
would want to continue treatment in such circumstances, does the state
have an interest in providing such treatment.
Justice Brennan found that Missouri's intrusion into the decision-
making process went beyond its only legitimate interest of ensuring ac-
curate fact-finding. He concluded that the clear and convincing standard
as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court apparently required the
execution of a living will before treatment could be terminated on behalf
of an incompetent patient in that state.94 Because so few people execute
living wills, requiring the execution of a living will as a condition of being
able to refuse treatment if one later becomes incompetent, constituted an
unwarranted intrusion on the constitutional right to refuse treatment.
He acknowledged that states remained free to fashion procedural pro-
tections to safeguard the interest of incompetents under these circum-
stances, noting that nothing in the federal Constitution in his view
prevented states from reviewing the advisability of a family decision by
requiring a court proceeding or the appointment of an impartial guardian
ad litem.
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for re-
cognizing a state interest in preserving life for a patient in a chronic
vegetative state, rather than in determining what is in the best interests
of such a patient given the quality of life available to them. The effect of
the majority opinion, according to Justice Stevens, is to deprive the in-
competent patient of the constitutional right to be free from unwanted
medical treatment unless such patient has had the foresight to make an
unambiguous statement of their wishes while competent. Justice Stevens
felt that it went beyond the state's legitimate interest to, in effect, attempt
to define life by insisting Nancy Cruzan's physical existence be perpet-
uated without regard to the quality of life available to her and the con-
sequences for herself and her loved ones.
C. Conclusions
The narrow holding of a deeply divided court was merely that the State
of Missouri could properly require clear and convincing evidence, beyond
93 Id. at 2864-65.
Id. at 2875.
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prior remarks to acquaintances, that a patient in a persistent vegetative
state would have wanted life support efforts to be terminated. Such a
narrow holding only affects a small fraction of the life support withdrawal
decisions being made every day in this country since, according to the
majority, only two states (New York and Missouri) so narrowly interpret
that standard of proof in this type of case. As stated previously, the Cruzan
decision is more significant for the questions it leaves unanswered.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE CRUZAN DECISION ON EXISTING OHIO LAW
A. Constitutional Issues
A competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest to
refuse life-saving medical treatment, including hydration and nutrition.95
The liberty interest in being free from unwanted medical treatment has
been variously described as "significant"96 or "substantial.."9 7
Although the Cruzan court avoided a discussion of "either the measure
of the liberty interest or its application"98 as to incompetent patients, in
his dissent, Justice Brennan openly asserted that this liberty interest is
a "fundamental"' right. Nothing in the majority opinion would detract
from this conclusion.100 In fact, the majority never disputed and, appar-
ently assumed for purposes of its decision, the trial court's conclusion
15 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (a prisoner "possesses
a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antip-
sychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
91 Id. at 1041. ("The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting per-
son's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.");
Washington, 110 S. Ct. at 1045 (Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting) ("The
liberty of citizens to resist the administration of mind altering drugs arises from
our Nation's most basic values."); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (Both
children and adults have "a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment."); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439
(1957) (Concluding that an individual has a right "that his person be held in-
violable.").
98 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ("Thus, freedom from unwanted medical attention is un-
questionably among those principles 'so rooted in the traditions and conscious of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "). The fundamental nature of the
liberty interest at stake is recognized by Ohio law which holds that freedom from
unconsented treatment is so important that one can sue for battery even if "the
procedure is harmless or beneficial." Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (Leach I/), 13
Ohio App. 3d 393 at 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Summit Cty. 1984) citing Lacey
v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
- However, the difficulty with this decision is that as Justice Stevens indi-
cated, the Court might be stating that "chronically incompetent persons have no
constitutionally cognizable interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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that Nancy Cruzan had a "fundamental right" under both the state and
federal constitutions to refuse life-saving treatment.10 1 Regardless of
whether the liberty interest is fundamental, it encompasses the right to
refuse nutrition and hydration since this form of medical treatment can-
not readily be distinguished from other forms of treatment. 10 2 However,
to protect this interest, due process only requires that a state "repose
judgment on these matters" with the patient and does not require it to
"confide the decision to close family members.'10 3
Any liberty interest recognized under the Constitution is not absolute;
the determination of whether the deprivation of this interest is consti-
tutionally permissible requires application of a balancing test to weigh
the competing interests at stake. 0 4 Four potential state interests are
generally asserted when an individual chooses to terminate or forego
medical treatment. 10 Foregoing a discussion of other three state inter-
ests, 10 6 the Supreme Court recognized that a state could "assert an un-
qualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against
the constitutionally protected interest of the individual.' 0 7
Acknowledging that there was "no gainsaying" the state of Missouri's
interest in the protection and preservation of human life, 08 Justice Bren-
nan articulated the majority's unstated but implicit proposition that until
an incompetent's wishes are determined, the only legitimate state interest
10, The Cruzan majority also suggested that the liberty interest at stake was
fundamental when it stated that "[w]e think it's self-evident that the interests
at stake in the instant proceedings are more substantial, both on an individual
and societal level, than those involved in a run-of-the-mine (sic) civil dispute."
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854. While it is reasonable to conclude that this interest
is fundamental, the majority's conspicuous failure to expressly articulate this
conclusion suggests that it may not be.
102 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 ("[T]he forced administration of life-sustaining
medical treatment, and even of artificially-delivered food and water essential to
life would implicate a competent person's liberty interest."); see also Id. at 2857
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water.").
103 Id. at 2855-56.
1o4 Id. at 2851-52.
"01 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9,426 N.E.2d
809, 814-15 (Summit Cty. 1980) (These include the preservation of life, protection
of third parties, the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession,
and the prevention of suicide.).
I- The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the only state interest im-
plicated in this case was the preservation of life. Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. en banc 1988).
107 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990);
see also Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 420 ("[T]he state's interest
is in life; that interest is unqualified."). However, the Missouri Supreme Court
noted that in "striking the balance between a patient's right to refuse treatment
... and the state's interest in life, we may not discount either side of the equation
in order to reach a result." Id. at 422.
108 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
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is one that safe-guards the "accuracy of that determination."10 9 For both
the Missouri Supreme Court as well as the United States Supreme Court,
the state's interest in the preservation of life predominated "in the face
of the uncertainty of Nancy's wishes."110 The state's legitimate interest
is in determining what the patient's choice would be if competent. Had
there been sufficient evidence of Nancy's wishes, it is likely that both
courts would have permitted the guardians to exercise substituted judg-
ment on Nancy Cruzan's behalf.' What Cruzan appears to be saying is
that the four state interests are not to be considered as part of the bal-
ancing test when evidence of a previously competent person's choice sat-
isfies the state's evidentiary standard." 2
The Supreme Court's failure to set any clear parameters as to the degree
or level of the state's interest suggests that any distinctions between dif-
ferent types of medical treatment or a patient's status, whether terminal
or otherwise, are in essence factors in the patient's decision whether to
terminate treatment, and not part of the state's interest. The bottom line
is if the incompetent patient has made a prior competent choice and left
evidence of his or her wishes sufficient to satisfy the state's legitimate
evidentiary standard, the state has no further legitimate interest to assert.
For example, in determining the extent of the state's interest in pre-
serving the life of a patient in a permanently vegetative state, the Leach
I court first concluded that clear and convincing evidence (in the form of
oral statements to family and friends) regarding Mrs. Leach's wish to
terminate treatment existed. The court then examined whether there was
any benefit to the state in preserving Mrs. Leach's life. The court held
that not only was there no benefit to the state from preserving Mrs.
Leach's life but that it was detrimental to the state to do so." 3 Although
the Leach I court was balancing the state's interests with Mrs. Leach's
fundamental right to privacy, which required a compelling state interest
to overcome, it is likely that the outcome of the case would be the same
if the right to refuse had been predicated on the liberty interest articu-
lated by the Cruzan majority. The key to the Leach I decision was that
the evidentiary standard was satisfied and there were simply no coun-
tervailing state interests to override that determination.
'0 Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The only clear evidence of the major-
ity's acceptance of this proposition is the statement that "Missouri may legiti-
mately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice .... Id. at 2853.
110 Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
- Id.
11 See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor strongly
suggests that the federal Constitution may require a state to defer to the choices
of surrogate. In the context of a previously competent person, state interests other
than those related to making an accurate determination of how the patient would
choose are simply irrelevant.
11 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9,426 N.E.2d
809, 814 (Summit Cty. 1980); accord Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Missouri does not claim, nor could it, that society as a whole will
be benefitted by Nancy's receiving medical treatment.")
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Acknowledging that the Cruzan decision was not a case requiring a
determination of whether a state is "required to defer to the decision of
a surrogate if competent and probative evidence establishes that the
patient herself had expressed a desire that the decision to terminate life-
sustaining treatment be made for her by that individual,' " 4 Justice
O'Connor strongly suggested that a state's decision whether to give effect
to the decisions of a surrogate decision-maker may well have constitu-
tional dimensions. 115 Mindful that as yet there is no constitutional re-
quirement for a state to defer to the decisions of a surrogate decision-
maker, Justice O'Connor stated: "[a] duty may well be constitutionally
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treat-
ment."
11 6
If a state's legitimate interest is limited to an accurate determination
of how the incompetent would choose, then statutory restrictions on the
right to choose treatment must be reasonably related to determining the
patient's desires. 1 7 If a person, while competent, appoints a surrogate
decision-maker and clearly indicates that decisions regarding life-
sustaining treatment should be made for him or her by that proxy, the
limitations in the Ohio Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care statute
impinge upon that individual's right to refuse treatment. Under the stat-
ute, an attorney in fact cannot refuse medical treatment necessary to
sustain the principal's life unless death is "imminent.""', In addition, an
attorney in fact cannot refuse or withdraw informed consent to the pro-
vision of nutrition or hydration unless death is imminent and the non-
provision of either would not likely result in the principal's death by
malnutrition or dehydration. 1 9 The statutory limitations would seem to
preclude the refusal or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in all but
the most extreme circumstances. One problem posed by these restrictions
is the inherent difficulty in making this kind of medical determination.
Moreover, sophisticated medical technology may prevent a person from
reaching a state of existence consistent with the statute's requirements
for termination or refusal of medical treatment necessary to sustain the
principal's life.
114 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856.
115 Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'"The difficulty with this conclusion is that an entire group of people, those
who are never competent, apparently have no constitutional right to be free of
unwanted treatment since they can never clearly articulate their choices.
118 "Imminent" has been judicially defined as death within less than one month.
See Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208 at 213, 549 N.E.2d 571, 575-76
(Montgomery Cty. 1989). The term "imminent" may be interpreted differently by
various Ohio courts.
9 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.14(E)(2)(a) (Baldwin 1989). A determination
that the administration of nutrition and hydration would not provide comfort to
the principal is also required prior to refising or withdrawing nutrition and
hydration. Id.
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Although the statutory limitations would appear to be a reflection of
the state's interest in the preservation of life, 20 Ohio's prohibition on
terminating medical treatment unless death is imminent, and nearly
absolute prohibition against terminating nutrition and hydration, even
when that is the choice made by a previously competent person and
exercised by the attorney in fact, does not appear to comport with due
process requirements. As previously stated, when a person exercises a
right to refuse treatment through an attorney in fact, any asserted state
interest is limited to whether there is clear and convincing evidence of
the principal's choice of a decision-maker.
This determination need not be judicial.12' The proper inquiry in a case
where the attorney in fact is exercising the patient's choice regarding a
decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment as determined by Ohio
courts, is whether clear and convincing evidence of that person's intent
exists.122 Once this standard is satisfied, then the person's constitutional
right to choose, as exercised through the attorney in fact, must be given
effect. 23 Given that an attorney in fact is merely exercising a previously
120 It has also been suggested that "at some point new constitutional interests
may be asserted - those of the physician and the health care facility. Can the
state compel a health care provider to administer treatment that the provider
considers inappropriate, against the will of the patient? *** If the state determines
that it has an overriding interest in preserving the lives of persons in a persistent
vegetative state, against their will, the burden may be on the state to find the
practitioners to provide this life-sustaining treatment." Witherell, In Open Court,
Withholding Treatment: Couture v. Couture, 1 HEALTH LAW J. OF OHIO, 74-76
(Nov.-Dec. 1989) (emphasis added).
121 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) ("Due Process has never been
thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or
a judicial or administrative officer."); accord Washington, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042
(1990).
122 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 n. 12,
2857 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Clear and convincing evidence is "more
than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required
beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and
unequivocal." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118, 123 (1954).
123 It has been suggested that the policy underlying the limitations to the
attorney in fact's powers is to preserve a court's ability to protect an incompetent
person's rights and balance them against the state's interest. See Note, Nutrition
and Hydration under Ohio's DPAH: Judicial Misconstruction Threatens the Right
to Choose Death with Dignity, 30 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 279 (1990). Historically,
courts have not been involved in a competent person's determination of whether
to forego life sustaining treatment absent circumstances where important inter-
ests of third parties were involved. Thus, prior to Leach II, court intervention had
not been required for the termination of life sustaining treatment. Similarly, an
attorney should not be subject to judicial scrutiny absent unusual circumstances.
See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. However, prior to Leach II, court
intervention had not been required for the termination of life sustaining treat-
ment.
If the suggestion is that whenever an attorney in fact chooses to terminate or
withhold nutrition and hydration court review is required, this will be an addi-
tional burden upon the court system and judges who may not be best situated to
make these decisions. This conclusion is in accord with the Guidelines' position
that few of these decisions should come before the court. Guidelines, supra note
31. The court system should take administrative steps to "forestall the routine
use of the judicial system to review [life-sustaining medical treatment] decisions."
Id. at 6.
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competent person's right to choose, the statutory limitations regarding
nutrition and hydration are unconstitutional since they deprive a person,
without process, of his constitutionally protected liberty interest.
124
Similarly, the sweeping pronouncement in Couture that Ohio's Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care statute, even in the absence of an
executed durable power, prevents the withdrawal of nutrition and hy-
dration from a ward by a guardian would probably not survive consti-
tutional challenge under the principles enunciated in Cruzan.125 It is well
settled that a state cannot arbitrarily restrict the exercise of constitu-
tional rights. 126 Although the guardian is acting under the state's parens
patriae power and must act in the ward's best interests, when the ward
has evidenced an intent that life-sustaining measures not be used or
continued, this factor should be given great weight in determining what
course of conduct is in the ward's best interests. If evidence of the ward's
intent satisfies the clear and convincing standard, the federal Constitu-
tion appears to require that the ward's choice be given effect.
B. Standards of Review for Decisions to Terminate Treatment
in Absence of Durable Power
Evidence of a patient's intent to forego or terminate medical treatment
must be established by clear and convincing evidence in Ohio. 27 This was
the same standard adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court's analysis of Ohio law if con-
fronted with facts similar to those in Cruzan would be the same.
In the absence of a durable power or living will, satisfaction of this
standard generally requires testimony regarding a person's expressed
124This is distinguishable from a guardian/ward relationship which is a state-
created relationship in which the state asserts its parens patriae power (the state's
power to protect the health, comfort and welfare of citizens under a disability).
In Ohio, a guardian has statutory authority to "authorize or approve the provision
to [the] ward of medical, health, or other professional care, counsel, treatment,
or services...." OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.13(C) (Baldwin 1990). However, the
guardian's authority may be limited by the probate court. Id. Thus, in a guard-
ianship situation, it may be necessary to require judicial review to determine
whether clear and convincing evidence of the ward's intent regarding treatment
exists. See infra section IV (D) (7) of this article.
121 Couture's interpretation of the statute would be nullified if proposed legis-
lation were to pass. See infra note 171.
126 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (Due process protects the
individual against arbitrary governmental action); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) ("liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation" to a legitimate public purpose); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368
(Fla. App. 1986), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
12, Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 11, 426
N.E.2d 809, 815 (Summit Cty. 1980); Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d at 214, 549 N.E.2d
at 576.
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preferences to forego or terminate life-sustaining treatment.128 The Mis-
souri Supreme Court stated that "[a] decision to refuse treatment, when
that decision will bring about death, should be as informed as a decision
to accept treatment.'1 29 Informed consent or refusal requires that a patient
possess the capacity to consent, that consent be voluntary and that the
patient have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of treatment
or non-treatment, and the nature of the disease and the prognosis. 10 Thus,
in Missouri the standard of evidence to establish a patient's intent to
refuse or forego treatment is exacting and appears to be the same as that
required for informed consent.'3' In light of this, according to the Missouri
Supreme Court, Nancy Cruzan's "'informally expressed reactions to other
people's medical condition and treatment" did not constitute clear proof
of her intent regarding nutrition and hydration. 3 2 By comparison, an
Ohio court has stated that under the appropriate circumstances a patient's
"general statements" may be considered by a court in determining the
intent of a person in a chronic vegetative condition. 1n
For example, in determining whether to discontinue a ventilator, the
court in Leach I held that the clear and convincing standard was satisfied
in that case.1 34 A total of 17 witnesses testified regarding Mrs. Leach's
preference not to be placed on life support systems in light of her prog-
nosis.135 Close relatives, including her husband, sister and a cousin, re-
called numerous conversations in which she expressed her desire not to
be placed on life support systems. Several of these conversations occurred
after Mrs. Leach was informed that she was afflicted with a progressively
deteriorating, disabling disease of the nervous system. In fact, the last
of these conversations occurred only two days prior to her entering the
hospital and a full six weeks after she was initially informed of her fatal
diagnosis. One witness was able to recall the exact words of a conversation
in which Mrs. Leach had stated that being placed on life support systems
terrified her and that" 'I don't want to live if I have to be a vegetable.' "136
12 See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2854-55 (1990); Leach 1, 68 Ohio Misc. at 3, 4, 426 N.E.2d at 815. A durable power
of attorney for health care is clear expression of person's treatment preferences.
See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Probative evidence of
a patient's choices includes the appointment of a proxy health care decision
maker.)
12 Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. en. banc. 1988).
:
311 d. at 417.
131 The same standard apparently applies in Ohio as well. See Estate of Leach
v. Shapiro (Leach II), 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 397, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Summit
Cty. 1984). "Before this refusal [of medical treatment] can controvert the implied
consent of a medical emergency, however, it must satisfy the same standards
of knowledge and understanding required for informed consent." Id. In a
non-emergent situation, the same standard would apply.
132 Cruzan, 110 St. Ct. at 2855.
13 Leach II, 13 Ohio App.3d at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
1'1 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Summit Cty. C.P. 1980).
132 Mrs. Leach was expected to die within three to five years.
13 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), Ohio Misc. 1, 4, 426 N.E.2d
809, 811 (Summit Cty. 1980).
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Similarly, the court in Couture' 37 determined that the decedent, Daniel
Couture, had made "legally significant" statements regarding his intent
to forego life support. Evidence regarding Daniel's intent was found to
be clear and convincing because there were numerous conversations over
a significant period of time, which were made with knowledge of the risk
of his then existing health problems. Although the only testimony came
from his mother and brother, the court determined that as witnesses they
were inherently reliable since "their desire to act scrupulously in a matter
of this kind is natural and obvious."'138 The brevity of Daniel statements
did not detract from their legal significance particularly in light of the
fact that no contrary evidence was presented. The court held that it was
not necessary that the evidence show precisely what Daniel would do in
the present circumstances since:
[a]pplication of such a standard would impose impossible bur-
dens as it could almost never be shown that the precise cir-
cumstances were anticipated. 139
Other Ohio courts faced with similar issues may attempt to limit the
application of these cases since the patients in both Leach I and Couture
were aware of their fatal prognosis prior to the time they made statements
regarding their desire to forego life support systems. 14 0 In a situation
where a person does not have a fatal illness, evidence of a more exacting
nature may be required. Particularly in light of Cruzan, it would seem
that more than general statements regarding life support could be con-
stitutionally required by a state to satisfy the evidentiary standard. While
Couture suggests that the evidence not need precisely show what a person
would do under a set of circumstances since the precise circumstances
can never be anticipated, it may be necessary that a person's expressions
clearly evidence an intent to forego or terminate life-sustaining treat-
137 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Montgomery Cty. 1989).
38 Id. at 214, 549 N.E.2d at 576. In fact, one noted ethicist observed that state
legislatures "would do well to recognize that most families can and do speak for
their loved ones" and suggests that the evidentiary burden be placed "on the state
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the family's wishes are inconsistent
with the wishes of the patient before removing decision making authority from
the family." Annas, Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED.
670, 672 (Sept. 6, 1990).
139 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571, 576 (Montgomery
Cty. 1989).
14- It could be argued that in these two cases, the patients' decisions to forego
met all the elements for informed consent or in their cases, informed refusal.
With equal persuasiveness, these cases may be cited for the proposition that in
Ohio, casual oral remarks constitute clear and convincing evidence of a person's
intent regarding life-sustaining treatment. Alternatively, they may represent the
position that oral statements only constitute clear and convincing evidence when
made after a person becomes aware of a fatal prognosis, thus excluding a large
percentage of those who are suddenly injured or taken ill. Either interpretation
would be constitutional under Cruzan. However, the interpretation chosen would
have a significant impact on the outcome of these types of cases.
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ment. Although Ohio courts appear to be willing to accept that a person's
prior statements may constitute clear and convincing evidence, there
remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding what type and amount of
evidence satisfies this burden14 1 and whether an evidentiary hearing by
a court is necessary to determine if the clear and convincing standard
has been met.1 4 2 This uncertainty could lead to the adoption of different
evidentiary and judicial review requirements by different lower courts
in Ohio. This reinforces the need for a legislative solution so that all Ohio
citizens, similarly situated, will be able to exercise their constitutional
right to refuse treatment equally, without regard to the county in which
they reside.
C. What Can Ohio Residents Do to Ensure that Under No Circumstances
Will They be Maintained in a Persistent Vegetative State?
Although there does not appear to be anything an Ohio resident can
do under current law to guarantee that their life will not be artificially
prolonged, there are steps one can take in Ohio which may increase the
chances of achieving that result.
First, a durable power of attorney for health care directive should be
executed. However, the present statute effectively denies the attorney in
fact the power to terminate care in cases where death is not imminent
or to terminate nutrition and hydration, even if that is the choice of the
principal.
Even though no living will statute has been enacted as yet in Ohio, a
living will should also be executed, either as a separate document or as
part of a durable power. 14 The living will should set forth the type of
141 In light of Cruzan, one commentator has stated that "many observers are
hard-pressed to imagine the kind of oral testimony that would satisfy a court in
a state with a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard" in the absence of a specific
writing. Apfel, Cruzan Leads Courts, Legislators To Rethink Right-to-Die Issues,
13 NAnL LAW J. 22 (Nov. 19, 1990).
'
42 As previously noted, Leach 11 held that judicial authority is required before
life-prolonging treatment may be terminated from an incompetent. 13 Ohio
App.3d at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1052-53. This is contrary to the position taken in
the Guidelines which states that "judicial involvement should occur only when
there are irresolvable disagreements... or there are serious grounds for believing
there is a need for protective services." Guidelines, supra note 31, at 8. See also
Deciding to Forego, supra note 49, at 160 ('"outine judicial oversight is neither
necessary nor appropriate."). However, Justice Brennan agreed that "states are
free to fashion procedural protections" including judicial review to ensure that
decisions are made "commensurate with the will of the patient." Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2876 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
"13Justice Brennan noted that most American's do not execute advance direc-
tives. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2875 n. 21 (a recently conducted study found that
only 9% of people had executed an advance directive). However, the publicity
surrounding the Cruzan decision has resulted in a 500% increase in living will
requests to the Society For the Right to Die. As of October 1990, more than 400,000
requests for living wills and durable powers of attorney had been filled. Concern
For Dying/Society for the Right to Die, Newsletter, Fall 1990, at 1.
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treatment that the person would or would not want and the circumstances
under which the withdrawal or withholding of treatment should occur,
including the termination of treatment where death is not yet and the
withdrawal of hydration and feeding. Again, although a living will is not
yet statutorily authorized in Ohio, it will assist the family and health
care providers in ascertaining a person's intent regarding life-sustaining
treatment and will provide an additional piece of evidence in meeting
the clear and convincing standard.'"
Finally, clear and detailed statements of a person's choices regarding
life-sustaining treatment should be made to family and/or significant
others. For those who feel strongly about this subject, it would be helpful
to have documentary evidence of such statements in the form of a video-
tape, audiotape or other method of recording.
As noted, most people will not take the time to implement any of these
recommendations. Even for those willing to take the time, at present,
there is nothing a person can do to guarantee that life will not be main-
tained in a technological limbo if incompetency occurs. A system to make
treatment decisions for those who leave insufficient evidence of their
intent is clearly needed.
V. THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION IN OHIO ON THE
RIGHT TO DIE
A. Deficiencies and Limitations in the Current Durable Power of Attorney
for Health Care Statute Itself
1. Problems with the Statute
Although the statute represents a step forward for Ohio, its problems
are numerous.145 The real problem with the statute stems from the fact
that it does not go far enough to preserve for all Ohioans the constitutional
right to forego or terminate all forms of life support through the making
of an advance directive. The power must be re-executed every seven years
to remain effective. The termination of medical care is limited to situa-
tions where death is imminent, and the termination of nutrition and
hydration is limited to the occasion where death is imminent or the
nutrition and hydration could not be assimilated or would shorten the
I" One commentator suggests that "anyone interested in expressing oneself on
this [withdrawal or refusal of treatment] subject should do so in the most detailed
manner possible. The assumption is that if a certain kind of treatment is not
addressed in the writing, such treatment could well be imposed by a court in the
event of litigation similar to Cruzan." Apfel, supra note 141.
'" For a brief discussion of the statute's limitations see Feibel, supra note 46;
Brown, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 61 CLEVE. BAR 50 (December
1989); Jenkins, supra note 63.
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principal's life.146 Thus, the statute fails to completely allay the classic
fear of being maintained in a permanent vegetative state, 147 because the
statute does not give to the attorney in fact all of the health care discretion
that the principal would otherwise have under Ohio law.
148
Further, the law provides absolute immunity to health care providers
who provide treatment "necessary to keep the principal alive" when the
patient is incompetent, even if such treatment is contrary to the princi-
pal's previously expressed intent and the express direction of the attorney
in fact. This far-reaching immunity may provide an impetus to provide
care under any circumstances and effectively thwart the principal's de-
sires to terminate or forego treatment as expressed through the attorney
in fact."19 This contravenes the purpose of the statute which is to effectuate
a principal's choices through the appointment of a statutory decision-
maker.150 Thus, a more comprehensive statutory scheme is required to
assure that a person's express wishes regarding treatment are carried
out.
Proposed Senate Bill 1 would implement several needed modifications
to this statute.15 1 It adds a definition of "comfort care" and greatly expands
I" Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(E) (Baldwin 1990). There is no authority
to refuse or withdraw care necessary to provide comfort to the principal. Id. at
§ 1337.13(C).
147 Jenkins, supra note 63, at 29. Indeed, many people feel that life as a per-
manently unconscious patient is more horrible than death. Deciding to Forego,
supra note 49, at 193.
I'l Although no Ohio case expressly recognized the right of a competent person
to refuse nutrition and hydration, as Cruzan suggests this would seem to be
encompassed in the right to self-determination. See 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[T]he refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encom-
passed" with a person's liberty interest and these interests "are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination"); Id. at 2866-
68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No material distinction can be drawn between...
artificial nutrition and hydration - and any other medical treatment. *** The
right to be free from unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate the po-
tential benefit of treatment and its possible consequences according to one's own
values and to make a personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intru-
sion.") Further, application of unconsented to medical treatment constitutes a
battery. See also Guth v. Huron Road Hosp., 43 Ohio App.3d 83, 539 N.E.2d 670
(Cuyahoga Cty. 1987) (continued administration of drug therapy after consent
withdrawn constitutes a battery).
Feibel, supra note 46, at 7, col. 2.
15 In general, health care providers cannot overrule a competent person's choice
regarding treatment without risking liability for battery. See Lacey v. Laird, 166
Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956) (In the absence of proper consent, even a
beneficial or harmless treatment is an assault and battery.). An additional prob-
lem with the statute is that a durable power of attorney for health care is only
valid for seven years from its execution. It is likely that persons who execute a
durable power will inadvertently fail to re-execute it. The effect, if any, of an
expired durable power of attorney for health care is uncertain.
11 S.B. No. 1, 119th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 1337.11-.17 (1991) (Montgo-
mery, et al.) (introduced 1/22/91 and referred to Reference and Oversight Com-
mittee on 1/3/91; passed by the Senate as amended 2/5/91). See also House Bill
70 which proposes essentially the same changes to the Durable Power of Attorney
for Health Care statute. H.B. No. 70, 119th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1991) (Guthrie,
et al.) (introduced 1/24/91 and referred to Civil and Commercial Law Committee
on 1/30/91). For a discussion of the living will provisions proposed by these bills,
see infra notes 166-91 and accompanying text.
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the definition of "terminal condition. 15 2 While an agent does not have
the authority to withdraw consent to "comfort care," an agent may with-
draw health care necessary to keep the principal alive when a principal
is in a "terminal condition" and the decision is either (1) "consistent with
the desires" of the principal or (2) is in the 'test interest" of the princi-
pal. 15
In addition to expanding the authority of the agent, this bill would
remove the limitations on who could be designated as an agent. 5 4 In
addition, the witness requirements would be greatly reduced. 155 Impor-
tantly, this bill would remove the present seven year re-execution re-
quirement and, thus, a validly executed durable power for health care
would not expire unless the document expressly provided for this.15 6 Adop-
tion of the modifications set forth in Senate Bill 1 would be a vital step
in ensuring the rights of all Ohioans to decline all forms of medical
treatment at any time their condition is terminal where they lack the
capacity to make such a decision.
152 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 1337.11(C) defines "comfort care" as "any
medical or nursing procedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that is
taken principally to diminish the pain or discomfort of a patient not to postpone
his death." 'Terminal condition" is "a condition caused by disease, illness, or
injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined by
a patient's attending physician, both of the following apply:
(1) There can be no recovery.
(2) There is a permanently unconscious state, or death is likely to occur within
a relatively short time if life-sustaining treatment is not administered."
Id. at § 1337.11(P). A "permanently unconscious state" means that "the patient
is irreversibly unaware of himself or his environment" and that there is "a total
loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the patient having no capacity
to experience pain or suffering." Id. at § 1337.11(N).
13Id. at §§ 1337.13(C), 1337.17. Health care includes "any care, treatment,
service or procedure to maintain, diagnose or treat individual's physical or mental
condition." Id. at § 1337.11(B).
In the version passed by the Senate on February 5, 1991, a principal must give
express authorization to an agent to refuse or withdraw informed consent to the
provision of nutrition and hydration by: (1) including a statement in capital letters
to this effect and (2) initialling or signing underneath or adjacent to this state-
ment. See Am. Sub. S.B. No. 1 § 1337.13(C), (E). While the "as introduced" version
of this bill deleted all references to nutrition and hydration, they were reinserted
by the Senate Reference and Oversight Committee.
l- An attending physician or an employee or agent of any health care facility
in which the principal is being treated may be designated as an agent if related
to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption. S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at §
1337.12(A)(2).
115 Id. at § 1337.12(B). In the version passed by the Senate, persons ineligible
to be witnesses are limited to those who are "related to the principal by blood,
marriage, or adoption," and the agent and attending physician of the principal.
Am. Sub. S.B. No. 1 § 1337.12(B). It removes the prior limitation which prevented
a person from being a witness if "entitled to benefit in any way" from the prin-
cipal's death.
156 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.12(A)(3) (Baldwin 1990).
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2. Problems With the Statute As Interpreted By Couture
The Couture decision extends the problems and limitations of the Du-
rable Power of Attorney for Health Care statute into the guardianship
area.157 A guardian's ability to exercise a ward's right to refuse medical
treatment had been previously recognized in Ohio.15 While the Leach I
case based this right on the patient's right of privacy, Leach 11 based this
on the common law doctrine of informed consent and its necessary cor-
ollary, that of the right to refuse treatment.5 9
As one commentator has observed, "[tihe fundamental error in Couture
is that it ignores a fairly clear indication that the General Assembly did
not intend to make the powers of other surrogates as limited as those of
an attorney in fact"'60 under the Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care statute. This is supported by express language in the statute:
This section does not affect, and shall not be construed as af-
fecting, any right that the person designated as attorney in
fact in a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care may have,
apart from the instrument, to make or participate in the mak-
ing of health care decisions on behalf of the principal.6 1
Thus, there was no intent that the limitations contained in the Durable
Power of Attorney statute be applied where no power has been executed.162
The Couture court erred when it determined that the limitations in the
statute defined the entire spectrum of patient rights that could be exer-
cised by a guardian. 163 Additionally, the Couture court's holding that
death was not "imminent" for purposes of the statute when Daniel Cou-
ture's death was expected within one to two months severely restricts the
application of the statute.'6 Finally, there was no legislative intent to
prevent the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from patients in a
persistent vegetative state. 6 5 Thus, in light of Couture, the state can
157 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Montgomery Cty.
1989).
156 See Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (Summit Cty. 1980); see also Estate of Leach v. Shaprio (Leach I/), 13
Ohio App.3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Summit Cty. 1984).
119 Leach II, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 393, 469 N.E.2d at 1047; see also Guth v. Huron
Rd. Hosp., 43 Ohio App. 3d 83, 539 N.E.2d 670 (1987).
160 Witherell, supra note 120, at 75.
161 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(2) (Baldwin 1990).
162 In fact, proposed substitute House Bill 56 expressly states that Couture
clearly misinterpreted the statute. See infra note 171.
163 See Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Florida App. 1986). (Living will
statute did not encompass every circumstance under which treatment living will
could be discontinued. Further, constitutional and common law rights could not
be limited by statute.).
1 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 213, 549 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Mont-
gomery Cty. 1989) ("Though Daniel Couture is terminally ill, death is not 'im-
minent.' "). The failure of the statute's drafters to define this term has resulted
in the attorney in fact being foreclosed from terminating nutrition and hydration
in most cases.
165 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(E) (Baldwin 1990).
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successfully override clear and convincing evidence of a patient's contrary
wishes even though the patient has not executed a Durable Power of
Attorney Health Care and his right to refuse treatment could have been
properly exercised by a guardian under prior common law.
B. Proposed Legislation in Ohio
Two bills were been introduced into the Ohio Senate-~ and one into
the Ohio House of Representatives 67 which would authorize living wills
in Ohio. The simplest, Senate Bill 17, would allow a person to execute a
written document to decline "medical measures" when a person lacks
capacity to make decisions regarding medical treatment and is either (a)
terminal, (b) permanently unconscious or (c) conscious but irreversibly
brain damaged. 68 It also provides immunity for compliance or noncom-
pliance with the terms of a living will, as well as criminal penalties for
"interference" with another's living will. 69
Of more importance is the comprehensive living will legislation pro-
posed by Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 70.170 Not only does the proposed
legislation authorize living wills, but as previously noted, it amends the
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care statute and clarifies the intent
of the legislature in enacting the original Durable Power of Attorney for
I" S.B. No. 1, supra note 151; S.B. No. 17, 119th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Seass.
(1991) (Zimmers, et al.) (introduced 1122/91 and referred to Reference and Over-
sight Committee on 1/30/91).
167 H.B. No. 70, supra note 151.
- "Medical measures" are defined as "any medicines, procedures, or devices
that a physician prescribes, administers, performs, or authorizes." S.B. No. 17,
supra note 166, at § 2108.31(K). "Terminal" is not defined. This bill parallels that
introduced last session by Senator Zimmers. See S.B. No. 380, 118th Gen. As-
sembly, Reg. Sess. (1990) (introduced 7/10/90 and referred to Judiciary Commit-
tee). Since the Assembly adjourned sine die in December 1990, bills introduced
last session must be reintroduced to receive further consideration.
Three other living will bills were also introduced last session. However, none
made it out of Committee. See S.B. No. 379, 118th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Seass. (1990)
(Nettle) (introduced 7/10/90 and referred to Judicial Committee); S.B. No. 383, 118th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1990) (Hobson-Zimmers) (introduced 8/2/90 and referred
to Judiciary Committee); H.B. 56, 118th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1990) (Guthrie-
Sawyer) (introduced 1/30/90 and referred to Civil and Commercial Law Committee).
1 9 S.B. No. 17, supra note 166, at §§ 2108.33(E), 2108.34(A)-(C).
170 See S.B. No. 1 and H.B. No. 70, supra note 151. In their original versions,
these bills were very similar. Significant differences in House Bill 70 will be
highlighted where appropriate.
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Health statute.1 71 The living will portion of the legislation would allow
a person to execute a written document indicating the declarant's intent
regarding the use of "life-sustaining treatment.'1 72
A declaration would be effective when an attending physician in "good
faith" and to a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" determines that
the declarant is (1) terminal and (2) lacks the capacity to make informed
decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment.
73
Both bills also provide sample documents, however, Senate Bill 1 requires
every document to use the terms "terminal condition" and "permanently
unconscious state" and to define the terms in a manner "substantially
consistent" with the definitions set forth in the legislation itself.174
"' See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
posed changes to the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care statute.
In setting forth the legislative intent underlying the original Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care statute, Senate Bill 1 expressly provides that:
[The] General Assembly did not include any intent to effect the ability of
competent adults or the guardians of incompetents or minors to make in-
formed health care decisions for themselves or their wards, including, but
not limited to, the refusal or withdrawal of informed consent to the provision
of nutrition or hydration to competent adults and wards. S.B. No. 1, supra
note 151, at § 5(B).
This would legislatively overrule the Couture decision.
172 "Life-sustaining treatment" is defined as "any medical procedure, treatment,
intervention, or other measure that, when administered to a qualified patient or
other patient, will serve principally to prolong the process of dying." S.B. No. 1,
supra note 151, at § 2133.01(0); see also H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at
§ 2133.01(M). This definition is broad enough to encompass the withholding or
withdrawal of nutrition and/or hydration. Neither bill would permit the with-
drawal of "comfort care," defined as "any medical or nursing procedure, treatment,
intervention, or other measure that is taken principally to diminish the pain or
discomfort of a patient, not to postpone his death." S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at
§ 2133.01(C); see also H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.01(C).
Before passage, the Senate Reference and Oversight Committee added a pro-
vision that requires a declarant to (1) expressly include a statement that nutrition
and hydration may be withheld and (2) to initial or sign underneath or adjacent
to this statement, in order to refuse nutrition and hydration. Sub. S.B. No. 1,
supra note 151, at § 2133.02(A)(1)(2).
173 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.01(A); see also H.B. No. 70, supra note
151, at § 2133.03(A). A "terminal condition" is defined as a "disease, illness, or
injury from which... (1) there can be no recovery, [and] (2) there is a permanently
unconscious state, or death is likely to occur within a relatively short time if life-
sustaining treatment is not administered." S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at
§ 2133.01(X); see also H.B. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.01(V). In S.B. No. 1 as
passed by the Senate, terminal status must be determined by two physicians. See
Am. Sub. S.B. No. 1 § 2133.01(Y). A "permanently unconscious state" includes a
persistent vegetative state. S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.01(R)(2); see also
H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.01(P)(1), (2) (permanently unconscious
state means that the declarant is "irreversibly unaware of himself or his envi-
ronment" and that there is "a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning" which
results in the declarant or patient having "no capacity to experience pain or
suffering.").
174 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.02(A). H.B. No. 70, supra note 151,
does not require that these words be used.
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An attending physician's determinations that a person is terminal and
lacks capacity to make informed decisions are deemed "conclusive.'
175
However, both bills also provide a mechanism for persons to object to the
attending physician's determination that a person is (1) terminal or
(2) that the "course of action proposed" is not authorized by the decla-
ration.17 6 An objection may also be raised that the document is invalid
because (1) the declarant was not of sound mind or otherwise lacked the
capacity to execute a declaration, or (2) the declaration does not comply
with the requirements set forth in the legislation. 177
Persons having standing to raise an objection are those (1) designated
in a living will as a person to be notified prior to the time that the terms
of a living will are given effect 178 or (2) a member of a list of individuals
provided in a descending oider of priority in another section of the leg-
islation (if no one is listed by the declarant as a person to be notified). 79
A person who chooses to object must advise the attending physician within
forty-eight hours after receipt of notice.180 A complaint must also be filed
within two business days in the probate court.'9 ' If, after the required
hearing,8 2 the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a factual
175 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.03(C); see also H.B. 70, supra note 151,
at § 2133.03(C).
17 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(A)(3); see also H.B. No. 70, supra
note 151, at § 2133.05(A)(3) (an objection may be raised to the attending physi-
cian's "determination" or that the proposed course of action is "not authorized"
by the declaration).
177 Id.
178 Before complying with the terms of a living will, an attending physician
must, among other things, make a "good faith effort" and use "reasonable dili-
gence" to (1) give notice of same to persons designated by the declarant or to one
of the persons specified in another section of the legislation, (2) record in the
medical record the names and manner in which notice was provided or the reason
the requisite notice was not provided, and (3) "afford time" for persons so notified
to object. S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(A); H.B. No. 70, supra note
151, at § 2133.05(A).
119 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at §§ 2133.05(A)(2)(a) (ii), 2133.08(B) (priority
is given in the following order: (1) the guardian, if any (2) the patient's spouse,
(3) a majority of the patient's adult children who are available within a "reason-
able period of time," (4) the patient's parents, (5) an adult sibling of the patient
or a majority of this class, and (6) the nearest adult blood relative available within
a "reasonable period of time."); H.B. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(A)(2)(a), (b)
(giving first priority to the patient's spouse; the guardian's priority, if any, is not
addressed).
180 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(B)(1); see also H.B. No. 70, supra
note 151, at § 2133.05(B)(1).
"' See S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(B)(1) (the failure to file a
complaint renders any objection void), and § 2133.05(B)(4) (requiring the probate
court to conduct a hearing after the complaint and notice of the hearing have
been served upon (1) the attending physician, (2) any health care facility in which
the declarant is confined, and (3) any other persons notified by the attending
physician although not joining in the complaint as plaintiffs); H.B. No. 70, supra
note 151, at § 2133.05(B)(1) (does not require that the health care facility be
named as a defendant).
12 A hearing must be held by the probate court within three business days
after service has been completed. S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.05(B)(4).
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basis exists for the objections raised, the court may issue an order. The
court's jurisdiction is limited to (1) an order requiring the attending phy-
sician to reevaluate the proposed course of action and/or the determi-
nation that the patient is terminal or (2) an order invalidating the
declaration.
Of great importance and utility is the inclusion of a surrogate decision-
making provision in the original versions of both bills.183 This establishes
a statutory decision-making mechanism when no declaration or Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care exists.'84 Both require that surrogate
decisions be made in good faith1 5 and that consent given by a surrogate
is not valid if it conflicts with the previously expressed intention of the
patient. However, absent actual knowledge of the patient's contrary in-
tent, health care providers may rely on a consent given as authorized by
this section. 18 6
Both bills include a grandfather clause which would give legal effec-
tiveness to living wills executed prior to the adoption of a living will
statute.18 7 Various immunities are also included for health care providers
and facilities. 18 8 In addition, both bills also provide that physicians, health
'ld. at § 2133.08(D); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.08(D). Unfor-
tunately, the Ohio Senate deleted the entire surrogate decision-making section.
This greatly reduces the utility of the bill since the majority of people will not
execute either a durable power of attorney for health care or a living will. See
supra note 142.
-84 A surrogate may also become the decision-maker when a declaration or
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care is not legally effective. S.B. No. 1,
supra note 151, at § 2133.08(A); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.08(A).
185 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.08(D); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at
§ 2133.08(D).
196 Id.
187 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.14. However, all living wills must
"substantially" comply with the statute to be legally effective. This condition
probably requires inclusion of the statutory definitions of terminal condition and
permanently unconsciousness state somewhere in the declaration. Thus, most
living wills executed in Ohio prior to the new legislation becoming effective will
probably have to be rewritten. See supra note 172. See also H.B. No. 70, supra
note 151, at § 2133.13-.14. In addition, living wills validly executed under the
laws of another state that "substantially" comply with Ohio's law are valid under
this statute. S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.13; H.B. No. 70, supra note
151, at § 2133.13.
118 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.10 (civil, criminal and immunity from
professional disciplinary action is provided for attending and consulting physi-
cians, health care facilities, and health care personnel acting under the direction
of an attending physician); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.10 (providing
similar immunities). However, neither bill grants immunity for "actions that are
outside the scope" of authority. See S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.10(D);
H.B. No. 70, supra note 151, at § 2133.10(D).
In addition, both provide that the death of a patient from the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment does not constitute a "suicide, aggravated
murder, murder, or any other homicide offense for any purpose." S.B. No. 1, supra
note 151, at § 2133.11(A); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151 at, § 2133.11(A).
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care personnel and health care facilities are not required to "take action
that is contrary to reasonable medical standards."'189
There is also a provision in both which provides that the rights enum-
erated are cumulative to those rights existing at common law so that the
statutory provisions are not the exclusive mechanisms to direct the with-
holding or discontinuation of medical care. 190 This is an important pro-
vision, particularly in states like Ohio where the restrictions in the
current statutory mechanism for surrogate decision-making have been
held applicable to a guardianship situation. 9' It clearly preserves both
the constitutional and common law right to refuse medical treatment.
While both bills are an excellent effort at a statutory solution of the
issues that currently exist in this area, there are several problems with
the proposed legislation. First, the deletion of the surrogate decision-
making section would greatly reduce the utility of this legislation since,
as noted, most persons will not take the time to execute either a living
will or Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. Additionally, standing
to challenge a decision is limited to certain enumerated family members
(in the absence of an express designation in a living will), thus excluding
other persons who may be more intimately acquainted with the patient.
Also, the legislation does not address whether the designation of a par-
ticular surrogate, or the decision of the surrogate, may be challenged.
Further, the priorities between the terms of a living will and those of a
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care are not clearly articulated.
Finally, the proposed definition of "permanently unconscious state" as
one in which a person has "no capacity to experience pain or suffering"
may give too much latitude to Ohio courts confronting the issue of whether
a person is "terminal" and provide courts with the opportunity to reject
a physician's determination that a person's condition satisfies this defi-
nition.192 However, the comprehensive approach to addressing termina-
tion of treatment issues reflected in this legislation represents a positive
step for Ohio.
199 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.11(C)(4); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151,
at § 2133.11(C)(4).
190 S.B. No. 1, supra note 151, at § 2133.11(C)(3); H.B. No. 70, supra note 151,
at § 2133.11(C)(3).
,91 Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App.3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Montgomery Cty.
1989).
192 For example, Edna Leach was described as grimacing in reaction to deep
pain although non-responsive to external stimuli. See Leach v. Akron Gen. Med-
ical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810 (Summit Cty.
1980). Similarly, Nancy Cruzan exhibited reflexive responses to sound and painful
stimuli. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845
(1990). Although both were considered to be in permanently unconscious or per-
sistent vegetative states, it is conceivable that an Ohio court confronted with the
issue of whether such persons lack the "capacity to experience pain or suffering"
could conclude that they do experience pain or that it cannot be ruled out that
they do not experience pain and thus, would not meet the statutory definition of
"terminal." Although both bills provide that a physician's determination of "ter-
minal" status is "conclusive," the potential exists to override a physician's de-
termination.
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C. Legislative Solutions From Other Jurisdictions
Forty states and the District of Columbia have living will acts. 193 Thirty
states have durable power of attorney statutes which permit an attorney
in fact to consent to medical treatment.1 9 4 Several of the living will stat-
utes expressly permit the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 195 A
growing number of durable power statutes either explicitly or implicitly
permit an agent to direct that life support be withdrawn. 96
In formulating policies and drafting legislation, an examination of rep-
resentative legislation from other jurisdictions illustrates the various
approaches taken by other states in this area. Although the different
types of legislation have been separated for purposes of discussion, the
best approach for solving the myriad of problems in this area is a com-
prehensive statutory scheme which includes not only a durable power of
attorney for health care but also a living will alternative, as well as a
mechanism for surrogate decision-making in the absence of an advance
directive. 197 A unified approach is best because it can coordinate the in-
teraction and authority of the various types of directives as well as avoid
potential gaps or conflicts between same.
A compromise to the near total ban in some states on the withdrawal
or withholding of nutrition and hydration is evidenced in two recent
statutes. In Maine, the statutory definition of life-sustaining treatment
does not include artificially administered nutrition and hydration. 98 How-
ever, a declarant may elect in the living will to include artificially ad-
ministered nutrition and hydration in the definition of life-sustaining
treatment.9 9 Thus, in Maine the presumption is that nutrition and
hydration will generally be administered unless the declarant directs
otherwise .200
In Florida, the term "life-sustaining treatment" does not include the
provision of sustenance or any medical treatment. These measures are
termed "comfort care. ' 20 ' Nutrition or hydration will be permitted to be
193 Society For the Right to Die, Artificial Nutrition and Hydration, Update on
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 1, 5 (Sept. 1990) (available from the Society
For the Right to Die, 250 West 57th St., New York, NY 10107).
194Id. at 6.
'Id. at 5.
I ld. at 6; see also Society for the Right to Die, Update on Tube Feeding in
the United States 1 (Aug. 30, 1990).
197 See, e.g., Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon 1990) and Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon 1989).
19 1990 Me. Legis. Serv. 830, § 5-701(4)(A).
1 Id.
Id. at § 5-702(b). Although the definition of life-sustaining is broad enough
under Senate Bill 1 to include nutrition and hydration, unless the declarant
expressly provides that it may be withheld or withdrawn, it will continue to be
administered.
2' 1990 Fla. Laws 223. § 765.03(3)(b).
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withdrawn or withheld as a life-prolonging procedure if (1) the living will
expressly authorizes this, and (2) it is medically determined that the
provision of sustenance is not comfort care but rather, a life-prolonging
procedure for a patient.2 2 These types of statutes offer some protection
to the incompetent whose wishes cannot be reasonably ascertained and
err on the side of preserving life.
In the instance where a declarant has left instructions regarding his
or her future treatment wishes, health care providers should be able to
implement the patient's wishes, since artificial distinctions between nu-
trition and hydration and other forms of medical treatment appear to
have been rejected by the Supreme Court.20 3 However, evidence of the
patient's wishes must meet the clear and convincing standard. A broadly
drafted statute such as these would likely survive constitutional chal-
lenge while protecting those whose future wishes were not as clearly
stated.
In attempting to address the concerns surrounding the provision of
nutrition and hydration to incompetents, New York's sweeping new
health care proxy statute20 4 sets forth a workable compromise. Case law
in New York requires that clear and convincing evidence of an incom-
petent patient's wishes regarding the provision of nutrition and hydration
must be satisfied in order to withdraw or withhold these measures. 20 5 This
statute allows the agent to make a decision regarding nutrition and hy-
dration if the principal's wishes are "reasonably known." 20 6 The principal
must affirmatively instruct the agent regarding future treatment choices
since another section. of the statute, providing a recommended form for
the health care proxy, states: "unless your agent knows your wishes about
artificial nutrition and hydration, your agent will not have the authority
to decide about artificial nutrition and hydration. '20°7
202 Id. at § 765.075(1). The use of the term "sustenance" also appears to be
somewhat ambiguous since it is unclear whether it is limited to the provision of
nutrition (food) or would also include fluids. Since a subsection of the statute
provides that nutrition or hydration artificially administered may be withdrawn
or withheld, it would seem that sustenance would include both. However, it would
have been better to avoid the use of the term "sustenance" in § 765.075(B), which
states that nutrition or hydration, artificially administered, may be withdrawn
if "the provision of sustenance is a life-prolonging procedure for the patient." Id.
203 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
0 1990 N.Y. Laws 752. This statute is based upon a proposal of the New York
Task Force on Life and the Law entitled Life Sustaining Treatment: Making
Decisions and Appointing a Health Care Agent (1987). The 26 member task force
included physicians, nurses, lawyers, philosophers and clergy from different re-
ligious sects.
In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In
re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 NY.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
m 1990 N.Y. Laws 752, § 2982(2)(a) (an agent "shall make health care deci-
sions: (a) in accordance with the principal's wishes, including the principal's
religious and moral beliefs.")
207 Id. at § 2981(5)(d). This will also be the rule in Ohio if Am. Sub. S.B. No.
1 becomes law in its present form. See supra note 153.
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Alternatively, treatment decisions may be made in accordance with the
principal's best interests, however "if the principal's wishes regarding
the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration are not reasonably
known and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, the agent
shall not have the authority to make decisions regarding these meas-
ures."208 This is similar to the provision in the Wisconsin durable power
of attorney for health care statute which allows an agent to consent to
the withholding or withdrawal of "non-orally ingested nutrition or
hydration" if the instrument expressly authorizes the agent to do this.
20 9
The New York statute also identifies the priorities between a designated
agent and other decision-makers. Generally, the principal's designated
agent should have priority over all other decision-makers 210 since the
agent is acting pursuant to the principal's express choice. Further, in
Tennessee, a subsequently appointed guardian of the estate does not have
any power to revoke, amend or replace a designated attorney in fact.21'
Anticipating challenges to an agent's priority or authority, New York
has included a dispute resolution mechanism within the statute. 21 2 De-
ference to the principal's choice is evident in that an agent's selection can
only be overridden if (1) the agent is not "reasonably available" or (2) is
acting in bad faith.213 An agent's decision may only be overridden if it
was (1) made in bad faith or (2) not in accord with the patient's reasonably
known wishes or in the patients best interests.214 This is similar to the
Tennessee statute which provides that an attorney in fact has priority
over any other person in making health care decisions unless clear and
convincing evidence demonstrates that the attorney in fact is acting in
bad faith.21 5 It is important in drafting these statutes to clearly identify
the priorities of decision-makers between agents named in a durable
power, surrogate decision-makers named in a living will, family or other
surrogates and a guardian, if one is appointed.2 16
The priorities between different documents must also be clearly iden-
208 1990 N.Y. Laws 752, § 2982(2)(b). The clear and convincing evidence stand-
ard appears to have been displaced by negative inference, since if a principal's
wishes are "reasonably known" then the agent can act in accordance with them.
Failure to provide affirmative instructions would preclude the agent from making
nutrition and hydration treatment decisions, as well as move the evidentiary
requirement up to the clear and convincing standard.
1990 Wis. Legis. Serv. 200 (West 1990) codified at Wis. STAT. § 155.20(4)
(1990) (the agent's power may be limited by a physician's determination that the
withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration would cause the principal
pain or reduce the principal's comfort.).
210 1990 N.Y. Laws 752, § 2982(4).
211 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 831, § 5(b)(2).
212 1990 N.Y. Laws 752, § 2992.213 Id. at § 2992(2).
214 Id. at § 2992(3).
"15 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 831, § 5(a)(1).
216 For example, in West Virginia, if the appointment of a guardian is sought
after the execution of a valid medical power of attorney, the statute provides that
the agent should be designated the guardian of the person for medical decision-
making in the absence of good cause weighing against such a designation.
W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4 (1990).
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tified.217 In Georgia, a living will is inoperative when an agent has been
appointed pursuant to a durable power of attorney for health care. 15
Georgia also recognizes the agent's priority over any other person in-
cluding any guardian of the person.
2 19
Of equal importance is the provision of an adequate dispute resolution
mechanism. This is vital in view of the reluctance and possible inability
of the judicial system to resolve disputes surrounding these types of treat-
ment decisions. 20 The best approach to this issue would be to require
judicial review as a last resort only when there is a dispute as to the
patient's desires. Even in that event, an institutional review mechanism
should be required prior to court intervention.22' As a check on the agent's
authority, Wisconsin provides that any person can petition for a deter-
mination of competency and request the appointment of a guardian.222
Thus, the court can review whether the health care agent is acting in
accordance with the terms of the power. If the court finds that the agent
is not acting according to the terms of the power it may (1) direct the
agent to do so, (2) order court supervision of the agent and require the
agent to report to the court, or (3) terminate the powers of the health
care agent.223 However, a judicial determination that the principal is
incompetent or partially incompetent, operates as a revocation of the
agent's authority in favor of the appointed guardian unless the court finds
that the agent's power should remain in effect.224
The aforementioned Illinois proposal provides a model for surrogate
decision-making without judicial intervention in the absence of an ad-
vance directive.22 The Act's provisions would take effect when a patient
is terminal, permanently unconscious or in an incurable or irreversible
condition. 226 Surrogate decision-makers are listed in decreasing order of
217 Where the provisions of a declaration (living will) and special directives in
a medical power of attorney are in conflict in West Virginia, the provisions of the
document executed later in time controls. Id. at § 16-30A-(4)8.
218 1990 Ga. Laws 1259 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-11 (1990)).
2 19 1d.
220 See Guidelines, supra note 31, at 14.
221 See S.B. No. 2213, 86th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1989-90) (would create the
Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act). Section 7 of this proposed
act would require every Illinois health care facility to establish a "mechanism
for the purpose of mediating and resolving, whenever possible, disputes over the
selection of the surrogate decision maker or life-sustaining treatment decisions."
Id. Further, a person challenging the selection or decision of a surrogate must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the decision was contrary to the
patient's wishes or best interests.
22
2 W IS. STAT. § 155.60(1) (1990).
Id. at § 155.60(4)(a)(1-3).
Id. at § 155.60(2). No standards are set forth in the statute for making this
determination. Any legislation should address the interaction of the various de-
cision-makers, and provide for an adequate dispute resolution prior to any redress
to the courts.
222 Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, S.B. 2213, 86th Ill. Gen.
Assembly (1989-90) (failed 6-8-90).
226 Id. at § 3. These conditions constitute qualifying conditions. When two phy-
sicians determine that a patient lacks "decisional capacity" and meets one of the
conditions, the decision making mechanisms of the Act are triggered.
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priority. These include: (1) the patient's guardian; (2) an individual(s)
"clearly identified" by the patient when the patient had capacity; (3) the
spouse; or (4) a majority of the patient's adult children. 227 If no surrogate
can be found, a health care facility's ethics committee would be permitted
to make a decision for an adult patient.228
Other states use a similar sequence of priority decision-makers. 229 How-
ever, provisions for non-family members to be recognized as decision-
makers should be included since these persons may have a closer rela-
tionship with the patient than the family. For example, in New York, a
"close friend" is authorized to challenge the appointment of a proxy
decision-maker. 23 0 A comprehensive statute should mirror the Illinois
proposal and include a "close friend" as a person who could be named as
a surrogate.
Some statutes also allow a person to disqualify potential health care
decision-makers. South Dakota allows any person to disqualify a family
member by a signed writing.231 In addition, the authority of a higher
priority or class of decision-makers may be delegated to a lower class. 232
This allows for shared decision-making because it removes the burden
where there is only one decision-maker. If several persons are members
of a lower class, a consensus of surrogates will determine what the health
care decision should be. This is in accord with the generally accepted past
practices of medical decision-making.
I" Id. at § 6. The statute also identifies several other more distant family
members as decision makers. However, it does not indicate when someone is
"clearly identified."
Id. at § 5(c)(2). Alternatively, if no surrogate can be found, it may be wise
to petition a court to appoint a guardian. See, e.g., 1990 Fla. Laws 232, § 15(2)(a)(b)(to eliminate the possibility of bias, the Florida statute states that the health
care facility may obtain a person who is "willing and competent" and "not em-
ployed or otherwise associated with the health care facility" to act as the surrogate
in an enumerated order of preference. However, if no person can be found from
those enumerated, the health care facility may petition for the appointment of a
guardian.).
219 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 221-2210 (1989); 1990 Fla. Laws 232, § 15(2)(a); 1990
Me. Legis. Serv. 830 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707(B));
S.C. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12C-1 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1990).
2 1990 N.Y. Laws 752, § 2992. A "close friend" is defined as a person eighteen
or older who presents an affidavit which states that "he has maintained such
regular contact with the patient as to be familiar with the patient's activities,
health, and religious or moral beliefs," along with the inclusion of sufficient facts
or circumstances which demonstrate this familiarity. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2961(5) (Consol. Supp. 1990); accord Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment Act, S.B. No. 2213, 86th 111. Gen. Assembly, § 3 (1989-90).
21, S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN. § 34-12C-3 (1990). Only family members are sta-
tutorily permitted to provide consent when no guardian or attorney in fact is
available. Further, a spouse who is legally separated from the patient cannot
consent under the statutory scheme. See also 1990 Me. Legis. Serv. 830,
§ 5-707(G).,
232 See 1990 Me. Legis. Serv. 830, § 5-707(C); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 34-12C-3 (1990).
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A health care decision should be made in accordance with the patient's
wishes. A more flexible standard has been adopted in Maine which states
that decisions should be made in the "best interest of the individual
consistent with the individual's desires, if known, and in good faith. '233
An invalid directive may be used as evidence of those wishes.23 4 Regard-
less of the standard used, an attorney in fact is required to use "due care
when acting for the benefit of the principal" and may be liable for the
negligent exercise of the power.
Judicial review of the surrogate's appointment and decisions is not
limited to particular persons in some states. Others limit standing to
those persons enumerated in the statute.23 5 For example, the Florida
statute provides that review of a surrogate's decisions or appointment
may be sought by the patient,236 health care professionals, the patient's
family, the health care surrogate or "other interested party. '237 In Maine,
any person with a "significant personal relationship" may petition to
court.
2 38
One question raised by these statutes is whether a lower priority
decision-maker can petition the court for the appointment of a guardian.
Generally, a guardian enjoys the highest priority in the decision-making
ladder, in the absence of a surrogate named in an advance directive. 239
It seems conceivable that a disgruntled family member could attempt to
control the decision-making by becoming the patient's appointed guard-
ian. Thus, any statutory scheme should address this circumstance, pos-
sibly requiring the appointment of an independent decision-maker. 24 0
D. The Need for a Comprehensive Legislative Solution
Given the serious constitutional issues presented by Ohio's limited
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care statute and case law, the
current common law and statutory scheme is unsatisfactory. Adoption of
Senate Bill 1 "as introduced" would resolve many of the issues presented
by Ohio's current common law and statute in light of the Cruzan decision.
1990 Me. Legis. Serv. 830, § 5-707(5)(D).
2" See, e.g., 1990 Ga. Laws 1259 § 31-36-10. It is noteworthy that Wisconsin
law provides that a durable power of attorney for health care that does not conform
to the statutory formalities "has no force or effect." 1990 Wis. Legis. Serv. 200,
§ 243.07 (6m).
-1 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(e) (1989).
- This would occur if the patient regained capacity.
237 1990 Fla. Laws 232, § 18(1). In Florida, the petition for review must simply
"state facts showing why the relief requested better reflects the patient's desires"
with regard to the appointment of a decision maker or the decision to be made.
Id. § 18(2).
238 1990 Me. Legis Serv. 830, § 5-707(F). However, this is limited to a deter-
mination of whether the health care decision was made in the best interests of
the individual. It does not grant standing to challenge the appointee named to
make decisions.
2 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(a) (1989).
240 See Guidelines, supra note 31, at 16 (recommending the use of trained, court
appointed guardians to make life-sustaining medical treatment decisions).
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This issue has brought to the forefront with the passage of recent federal
legislation which requires health care facilities and health maintenance
organizations receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds to provide written
information to adult patients regarding their rights under state law to
accept or refuse medical care and to formulate advance directives. 241 Such
Medicare and Medicaid providers must develop written policies and pro-
cedures regarding the implementation of advance directives, as well as
to inform patients of these policies.242 Given the current lack of clarity
and inconsistency in Ohio law, health care providers in this state will
have a hard time complying with this new law. The difficulty will not
only be in determining what the law is, but conveying it coherently to
patients and their families and friends. Since the federal law will take
effect in December of 1991, the Ohio legislature must address this problem
in the near future.
While the statutory schemes of certain other states have some desirable
features, none of them completely resolves these issues. What is really
needed is a comprehensive statute, such as that proposed by Senate Bill
1, to replace Ohio's current limited durable power statute. This statute
should include not only provisions for a durable power and/or a living
will, but also provisions for how treatment decisions on behalf of incom-
petent patients are to be handled in the absence of a durable power or
living will.
The essential elements of such a comprehensive legislative solution
would include:
1. The option of executing of a durable power of attorney for
health care should be expanded. As suggested by Justices
O'Connor and Brennan in the Cruzan decision, persons should
be given the opportunity to expressly authorize an attorney in
fact to withhold medical treatment even where death is not
imminent and to authorize the attorney in fact to refuse and/
or terminate artificial hydration and feeding. This would elim-
inate the constitutional issues presented by the current statute
in light of the Cruzan decision and would also avoid the issue
of what constitutes a "terminal" condition or "imminent" death.
The statute should expressly authorize the principal to consent
to organ donation, a post-mortem examination, and disposition
of the body.243 Also, the statute should allow for the designation
of an alternate agent if the named agent is unwilling or unable
to serve.
21 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 101st Cong., end Sess., Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 4751, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395cc(a)(1) and 1396(a)). See also Wagner, New Law Will Require Providers
to Inform Patients of Living Wills, MOD. HEALTHCARE 20 (Dec. 1990).
242 Id.
m See, e.g, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 831, § 5(b).
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2. A second option of executing a living will should also be
authorized. A person should be given the right in such a doc-
ument to expressly authorize withholding of medical treatment
in non-terminal cases, as well as withholding of artificial hy-
dration and feeding. Living wills executed prior to the adoption
of the statute or in conformity with the laws of other states
should be given legal effect in Ohio.
3. The effect of the passage of time after execution of a living
will should be made clear. Without guidance, it is troublesome
for health care providers to determine what weight to accord
a directive in a particular set of circumstances. The statute
should clearly articulate that either: (a) the passage of time
has no effect on the validity and weight to be accorded an
advance directive or (b) that an advance directive must be
reexecuted within a specified number of years.244 Although the
first alternative seems preferable, the primary aim of any stat-
ute should be clarity.
4. It should be made clear that the absence of a durable power
or living will in no way limits the ability of the next of kin or
a court-appointed guardian to refuse treatment on behalf of an
incompetent person. Limitations in the Durable Power of At-
torney for Health Care statute should not apply to guardian-
ship cases. This would legislatively overrule the Couture
decision.
5. There should be statutory authority for the closest next of
kin or a "close friend" to refuse treatment based upon a stat-
utory prioritization. An agent designated in a valid durable
power or living will should be given the highest priority. Where
such authorization is obtained, the termination of care should
be permitted without having to resort to judicial review. This
would clear up the confusion caused by the indication in Leach
H that the termination of life support can only be carried out
pursuant a court order.
6. An interested party should be given standing to seek ju-
dicial review of surrogate decisions, including the decision to
appoint a particular surrogate. Judicial review should be a last
resort and an institutional review mechanism should be re-
quired prior to court intervention. The list of those having
standing as interested persons to bring such actions (e.g., at-
tending physician, hospital administrator, close relatives, etc.)
should be narrowly defined in the statute. It would be advisable
to also provide standing to a "close friend" as defined in the
New York health care proxy law245 to accommodate persons in
non-traditional relationships.
2" Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.12(A)(3) (Baldwin 1990) (a durable power must
be re-executed every seven years unless a shorter time is specified in the instru-
ment since it expires seven years after the date of its execution).
2" See supra note 229.
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7. The standard of review in the absence of a durable power
or living will should be whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the incompetent patient would have desired
treatment to be terminated under circumstances. The statute
should make clear that prior statements by the patient can
constitute clear and convincing evidence where the fact-finder
is so persuaded. In addition, evidence other than statements,
such as a person's behavior and activity level, should be ad-
missible as well as an invalid directive executed by the patient.
While prior statements made with knowledge of a particular
life-threatening condition should be given greater weight, it
should be made clear that such knowledge is not an absolute
requirement for a prior statement to satisfy the clear and con-
vincing standard.
8. There should be no grant of immunity for a health care
provider who refuses to terminate care unless (i) the health
care provider questions in good faith either the validity of a
durable power or living will or whether there is clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's desires absent the same, or
(ii) there is a dispute among the statutorily designated class
of relatives authorized to give consent as to whether consent
should be given. This would hopefully eliminate the "Catch-
22" situation currently presented by the Leach I and Leach H
decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of additional piecemeal legislation (such as a new living
will statute) will not resolve the ambiguities and constitutional issues
presented by the current common law and statutory scheme in Ohio. Only
the adoption of comprehensive legislation as described above will resolve
such issues and eliminate such ambiguity, while at the same time pro-
tecting the constitutional right of previously competent persons to have
their desire to refuse or terminate treatment carried out.
Since, man, through his ingenuity has created a new state of
human existence - minimal human life sustained by man-made
life supports - it must now devise and fashion rules and pa-
rameters for that existence. That is the business [Ohio] is faced
with. 246
This task has been "entrusted" to the states by the United States Supreme
Court.247 Fulfillment of this public trust requires nothing less than pas-
2 Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center (Leach 1), 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6,426 N.E.2d
809, 812 (Summit Cty. 1980).
241 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sage of a clear, comprehensive statutory mechanism to address the issues
raised in this article. The adoption of Senate Bill 1 in its "as introduced"
form would be a giant step in that direction. The Ohio legislature should
not wait for another tragic case like Nancy Beth Cruzan's to occur in this
state before taking action.
